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Identity & protection

Protect identity, custody and private material

Understand where authority lives, what the proof prevents, and which device, file and disclosure boundaries still matter.

Reviewed 2026-10-25 · SDK 129.0.0Read Markdown ↗

Authority follows the admitted source

Receiz identity, proof, ownership and financial execution are admitted through their actual source contracts. A database row, copied owner label, edited amount or self-hashable wrapper cannot supply stronger authority. The enclosing artifact and required financial/ownership evidence must verify before their fields can be projected. This blocks a display or altered source from becoming a lawful operation merely because it looks convincing.

Different files carry different authority

Handle each original by its actual role
MaterialProtection boundary
Private Identity Record / Seal / KeyIdentity continuity and its required unlocking material.
Unprotected Vault private originalA bearer credential carrying separate Vault authority.
Passkey-protected Vault originalEncrypted authority requiring the original compatible passkey at its registered origin.
Public Vault proofSelected disclosed evidence without private access authority.
Private proof archiveSensitive retained proof data; the download is not password encrypted.
Screenshot or public labelPresentation; it cannot replace original admission.

PBI and passkey protection have different jobs

PBI is the implemented proof-bearing identity and supported recovery boundary. A passkey can supply its supported device/origin credential mechanism; it is not the entire source-carried identity, provenance and operation contract. Vault PRF protection encrypts the Vault’s separate private authority. Its recovery depends on the actual authenticator/provider and the original protected file. An ordinary identity backup cannot replace the Vault passkey or qualified Note custody.

Protect the unlocked environment

  • Keep private originals and recovery phrases out of public messages, analytics and model prompts.
  • Use the intended trusted application/origin before opening protected authority.
  • Review exact recipient, amount, source and operation before approving.
  • Treat an unlocked compromised device as a separate authority exposure; cryptographic proof does not make every running program trustworthy.
  • Keep current backups and resolve pending custody before removing storage.

Separate inspection from action

Independent inspection is read-only. It does not consume a Note, credit an account, establish fresh unspentness or authorize another transfer. Public proof should disclose only what the owner deliberately selects. If a source fails admission, retain it and inspect the exact refusal; do not bypass the verifier or create another issuer/signature layer to make the surface pass. Report problems with minimum public-safe references, never private authority.

Implementation sources

Inspect the exact path.

Source links retain revision 6c5d582. Read the documented operation and assessment scope alongside its code.